> TPM isn't for "security" in the abstract, it's fundamentally for authentication
What on earth do you think I make my users present keys for???
You know all those guides saying "you should never copy an ssh private key over the network. Make a new one for each device" that every idiot dev ignored? Now I can enforce that.
This article's method is bad, basically the same as systemd-creds (not itself bad, just extremely compatible), take a look at tpm-ssh-agent or gnupg for how to do that part the right way (the party they don't do right is bind/sign to pcrs, which is just low hanging fruit in today's day and age...)
If you run into the link to this, is love to read it. Proper, modern, pcrphase binding with a signing key should remove these firmware update issues irt the raw pcr value changing
Do you have any more info you could add about that topic, or a direction to point me? As far as I know, (systemd-)pcrphase is for measured boot, but I'm not sure how that interacts with signing keys.
As someone who stores my SSH keys in my TPM, and has struggled with picking the right PCR values for Secure Boot in the past, I'm interested in learning more.
I set up my orgs SPF/DKIM/DMARC (we self host, they have feelings about corporate data sovereignity...) it look about 30 min having never touched them before, and maybe another 15 to write an ansible playbook to rotate the keys.
We do have a _tremendous_ amount of spam fail these checks, as well as a few legitimate organizations.... Some of our peer companies have sent out notices that they will bounce anything that fail these checks in the coming years, and we're probably going to to do the same before too long.
What on earth do you think I make my users present keys for???
You know all those guides saying "you should never copy an ssh private key over the network. Make a new one for each device" that every idiot dev ignored? Now I can enforce that.
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